Taxation of Aircraft Motor Fuel by Tell, William K.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 2 | Issue 3 Article 4
1931
Taxation of Aircraft Motor Fuel
William K. Tell
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
William K. Tell, Taxation of Aircraft Motor Fuel, 2 J. Air L. & Com. 342 (1931)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol2/iss3/4
TAXATION OF AIRCRAFT MOTOR FUEL
WILLIAM K. TELL
Taxation of motor fuels used in internal combustion engines
was a necessary incident to the demand by motorists for improved
highways. The primary purpose of this article is to inquire whether
or not such taxes are valid when the motor fuel is consumed in
gasoline engines not using the highways, particularly in the case of
fuel used by aircraft. Such a result will be accomplished by an
analysis of the original purpose of the gasoline tax; by a presenta-
tion of the court decisions applying to taxation as they affect inter-
state and intrastate commerce, and as they affect government in-
strumentalities; and by showing that air navigation is so closely
connected with interstate commerce that it is difficult, if not im-
possible, to distingush what is interstate and what is intrastate
business.
Before the automobile became a common mode of transporta-
tion, the people of the states did not take particular interest in the
kinds or types of roads in their communities so long as these roads
were passable; and, while the cost to the states for roads was large,
it was not so great that it could not be met out of the general
revenue of the states. However, the advent of the automobile and
a consequent greater usage of the highways brought demands for
better roads. The general revenues of the states being inadequate
to meet these increased costs of construction, operation, maintenance
and control of highways, it was considered by the various legisla-
tures throughout the United States that it was only just that those
who used the roads, and thereby received benefits from the improve-
ments, should be required to pay for them. The result of this
was the general automobile license tax. But, as the number of
people owning automobiles increased, so in direct ratio the demands
upon the legislatures increased for more and better roads. The
revenue which the states were receiving from the licensing of
these automobiles being inadequate to meet the increased costs of
highways, it was logical that the legislatures in looking for another
source of revenue should turn to the gasoline consumed by these
vehicles and tax it. Such a tax was advantageous for two reasons:
first, the tax could be collected at the source or at the point of dis-
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tribution-namely, from the oil companies; second, it would be a
tax directly upon the people who were using the roads in proportion
to their use.
The states, in levying this tax on motor fuel, have resorted to
devious methods. Some states have levied the tax on gasoline sold
in the state under constitutional provisions permitting a sales tax;
others have taxed all gasoline manufactured, refined, or received
in the state; and still others have imposed the tax as a license tax
upon the privilege of the business of distributing gasoline or other
motor fuel, which fact can be readily seen from a study of the
summary of the gasoline tax laws of the several states listed be-
low. This summary shows the tax rate per gallon, the basis of
the tax, the refunds allowed-if any, and the time allowed for filing
claims.
SUMMARY OF GASOLINE TAX LAWS
Rate per
Gallon
(cents) Basis of Tax
Alabama 4 Selling or withdrawing
from storage
Arizona 51 Refining, manufactur-
ing, delivering, or im-
porting, used, distributed
or sold
Arkansas 62 Gas sold in the state for
purpose of propelling
motor vehicles on pub-
lic roads in the state
California 3 Refining, manufactur-
ing, producing, com-
pounded, sold and de-
livered
Colorado 4 All gas sold or offered
for sale
Connecticut 2 All gas sold or used in
state







Other than used in 1 year
motor vehicle on
highway
Of 4c if used for
any industrial or
domestic purpose-





Gas not used or 1 year after
sold for use in Purchase
operating motor
vehicles
On all not used in
motor vehicles on
highway
Gas used in motor
boats and for com-
mercial or manu-
facturing purposes
not in motor ve-
hicles









days a f t e r
purchase
1. Effective January 30, 1931.
2. Effective February 26, 1931.
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Rate per
Gallon
(cents) Basis of Tax
2 Motor fuel sold or used
All sold
Refunds Allowed
All not used in
motor vehicles on
highways of D. of
C.
None
















5 All motor fuel sold or
used
3 Sale
4 All gas used in state
3 All gas used or sold
3 All motor fuel on sale
or used in state









All except that 90 days
used in motor ve-
hicles on highways














Kentucky 5 All gas sold at whole- None
sale
Louisiana 5 All gas or motor fuel
sold, used or con-
sumed
58 Internal combustion
fuel sold and used
All lost or de- None
stroyed
Y of all except 9 months
4
used in motor ve-
hicles on high-
ways
Maryland 4 Number of gallons of
motor fuel used or sold






3. Effective July 3, 1931.
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Rate per
Gallon
(cents) Basis of Tax
Massachusetts 35 Each gallon of fuel
sold
Michigan 3 All gas sold or used in
motor vehicles on high-
way
Minnesota 3 All gas used on high-
way
Refunds Allowed
All except used in
motor vehicles on
highway
All other than used
in motor vehicles
on highway












Mississippi 5 All gas used or for sale None
to be used on streets
or highways
Missouri 2 All gas refined, manu-
factured, compounded,
imported, sold and dis-
tributed
Montana 5 All gas refined, manu-
factured, produced, im-
ported, sold or distri-
buted
All sold
All sold or used
4 All used or sold
New Jersey 3 All sold or issued in
motor vehicles on high-
way
All except motor 90 days
vehicles on high-
way




All except used 90 days
in motor vehicles
on highways
All except used 6 months
in motor vehicles
on highways
lc per gallon if Not shown
used in motor
boats. N o t col-
lected if not to be
used on highway












New York 2 Sale All except used 90 days
in motor vehicles
on highway
5. Effective May 1, .1931 to April 30, 1933.
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Rate per
Gallon
(cents) Basis of Tax
North Carolina 5 Sold, distributed
used
North Dakota 4 All motor fuel
4 All sold or used
Refunds Allowed









All except used Each quarter
in motor vehicles
on highway
All except used 90 days
in motor vehicles
on highways
Any not conslumed 30 days
in state, or if pur-
chased in 50 gal-














Fuel sold or used All not to be used
in motor vehicles
on highway
All gas sold, consigned, None
used, shipped, or dis-
tributed for sale in
state





All except used in 1 year
motor vehicles on
highways
Tennessee 5 Each gallon of gas sold None
or distributed
4 All sold All except gas used
in motor vehicles
on highways
410 All motor vehicle fuel None
sold or used





March 26, 1931 to December 31, 1931.
June 5, 1931.
10. Effective March 24, 1931.
Ohio
Oklahoma 58 Gas consumed
Oregon 4 All gas, used, sold
distributed
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Rate per
Gallon
(cents) Basis of Tax
Vermont 4 All sold or used. May
pay upon receipts less
1% thereof""
Virginia 5 All sold, used or de-
livered
Washington 412 Sold
West Virginia 4 Sold, purchased or used




Refunds Allowed filing claim
None None
All except used 30 days
in motor vehicles
on highways
All except used 30 days
in mot6r vehicles
on highway
All except used 60 days
in motor vehicles
on highway
All except used in Following
motor vehicles on quarter
highways
Wyoming 4 Sold None None
Taxation must be for a public purpose." A legislature has no
rightful power to impose taxes on the people for any other than a
public purpose, and the fact that the public benefits only incidentally
is not sufficient to sustain a tax.' 5 The test of what is a public
use and purpose depends largely upon the facts and circumstances
surrounding the particular subject matter in regard to which char-
acter of the use is questioned."8 It has been held, however, that
the power of taxation is exerted for a public purpose when the
money raised is to be applied to the construction and maintenance of
public roads.'7  The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws
does not deprive the states of the power to adjust their systems
of taxation in accordance with their own ideas of public policy.
They may, therefore, tax certain classes of property to the exclusion
of other classes so long as the classification is reasonable and
founded upon a real distinction and not a mere arbitrary basis.'"
Thus, persons following the same calling may b classified for
taxation according to the amount of their business. After the legis-
11. Effective March 10, 1931.
12. Effective April 1, 1931.
13. Effective April 1, 1931.
14. Cooley, Taxation, 4th Ed. Vol I, Sec. 174..
15. Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454 (1873).
16. Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 (1896).
17. State v. Marion, 82 N. E. 482 (1907) ; Prince v. Crocker, 166 Mass.
347 1896).
18. Johnston v. City of Macon, 62 Ga. 645 (1879); Cook v. Marshall,
196 U. S. 261 (1905).
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lature and the executive have both decided that the purpose for
which a tax is laid is public, nothing short of a moral certainty
that a mistake has been made can warrant the court in overruling
the decision.' 9
Therefore, a state statute declaring the purpose of a gasoline
tax to be the construction, maintenance, and care of highways is
a valid tax in that there is a public benefit. If the question were
raised whether there was a sufficient number of people to be bene-
fited so that the purpose would be public, the court could properly
take notice of the present economic and social structure of society
to sustain the tax. However, we have no quarrel with a tax on
motor vehicle fuel used in automobiles upon the highways, and
especially is this true when the enabling statute either exempts gaso-
line consumed in machines not using the highways-such as aircraft,
motor boats, gasoline propelled railroad cars, tractors, and station-
ary engines, or when there is provision for a refund for gasoline
so used; but when the statute provides for no exemption or refund
and the users do not directly benefit by the improved roads, et cetera,
a question of major importance is immediately presented: to wit,
why should such users of gasoline pay a tax thereon when the
purpose for which the tax is levied is to provide for highways?
Congress has been given exclusive control and regulation on
interstate commerce by the Constitution of the United States,2"
and it is a well settled rule that a state law which directly burdens
such commerce by taxation, or otherwise, constitutes a regulation
beyond the power of a state.2 To come within the rule, the in-
terference must be direct and substantial and not merely incidental,
22
and the states may under their reserved police powers enact laws
which will be valid although they may incidentally affect interstate
commerce.- The determination of how far a state may go in
legislation whch affects interstate commerce without violating the
Constitution is a problem which is always difficult. A statute im-
posing a tax upon freight accepted within the state to be shipped'
to a point without the state or accepted without the state and taken
to a point within the state was held to constitute a regulation of
19. Perry v. Keene, 56 N. H. 514 (1876).
20. U. S. 'Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 3.
21. Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co. 241 U. S. 48 (1916); Adams
Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218 (1909).
22. Hendrick v. Maryland 235 U. S. 610 (1915) ; Minnesota Rate Cases
230 U. S. 352 (1913).
23. Austin v. Tennessee 179 U. S. 343 (1900) ; Field v. Barber Asphalt
Pavinq Co., 194 U. S. 618 (1904).
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interstate commerce in conflict with the Constitution.24  A state
is without power to impose a tax on a person securing or seeking
to secure the transportation of freight or passengers in interstate
commerce.2 5 Likewise a statute requiring a license for the privilege
of selling steamship tickets or orders for transportation to or from
foreign countries was held invalid as a direct burden on interstate
commerce.
26
In Minot v. Philadelphia Wand B. R. Co.,27 a state tax on rolling
stock of a railroad was held invalid on the ground that the statute
constituted a regulation of interstate commerce. The court said,
"It is of national importance that in regard to such subjects there
should be but one regulating power, for if one state can directly
tax persons and property passing through it, or indirectly, by taxing
the use of the means of transportation, every other state may do
likewise; thus commercial intercourse between states remote from
each other may be destroyed. ' '2?a However, in Hump Hairpin
Manufacturing Co. v. Emmerson,28 the court stated, "while a state
may not use its taxing power to regulate or burden interstate com-
merce," citing U. S. Express Co. v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 335, and
International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135, "on the
other hand it is well settled that a state excise tax which affects
such commerce, not directly, but only incidentally and remotely,
may be entirely valid where it is clear that it is not imposed with
the covert purpose or with the effect of defeating Federal Constitu-
tional rights. As coming within this latter description taxes have
been repeatedly sustained where the proceeds of interstate com-
merce have been used as one of the elements in the process of
determining the amount of a fund (not wholly derived from such
commerce) to be assessed, and that the principles of the cases so
holding must be regarded as a settled exception to the general
rule.2 9 The turning point of these decisions is, whether in its in-
cidence the tax affects interstate commerce so directly and immedi-
ately as to amount to a genuine and substantial regulation of it or
restraint upon it, or whether it affects it only incidentally or re-
24. Case of State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232 (1873).
25. McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104 (1890).
26. DiSanto v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34 (1927).
27. 2 Abb. (U. S.) 323.
27a. Italics ours.
28. Maine v. Railway Co. 142 U. S. 217 (1891).
29. The cases cited by the court are: Wisconsin & Michigan R. R. Co.
v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379 (1903); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U. S. 107
(1911) ; U. S. Express Co. v. Minnesota. 223 U. S. 335 (1912) ; Baltic Mining
Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68 (1913).
THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
motely so that the tax is not in reality a burden, although in form
it may touch and in fact distantly affect it."
These cases, which modify the broad general rule laid down in
Minot v. Philadelphia B. R. Co.,80 might be cited in support of a
state tax on all gasoline although some of it may have been con-
sumed by aircraft flying in interstate commerce. The argument
being that the tax is not an unjust burden on commerce because
it affects it only remotely and indirectly, that it is not levied with
the purpose of defeating Federal Constitutional rights, and that
since the tax is for a public purpose it is therefore valid. Such
a line of reasoning, however, would still leave open the question
as to whether the tax could be lawfully collected where the gasoline
is not used on the highways.
These were the arguments presented to the United States Su-
preme Court in Helson & Randolph Co., Partners, v. Kentucky,81
where the validity of the Kentucky gasoline tax which provided for
no exemptions was brought to the court for interpretation. The
gasoline in question was used in a motor to propel a ferry boat
operating between Illinois and Kentucky. The lower court and the
state supreme court sustained the tax on the theory that it was an
excise tax which affected interstate commerce only indirectly. The
United States Supreme Court in reversing the decision of the state
court stated, "The tax is exacted as the price of the privilege of
using an instrumentality of interstate commerce. It reasonably
cannot be distinguished from a tax for using a locomotive or a car
employed in such commerce. A tax laid upon the use of the ferry
boat would present an exact parallel. And is not the fuel consumed
in propelling the boat an instrumentality of commerce no less than
the boat itself? A tax which falls directly upon the use of one of
the means by which commerce is carried on directly burdens that
commerce. If a tax cannot be laid by a state upon the interstate
transportation of the subjects of commerce, as this court definitely
has held, it is little more than repetition to say that such a tax
cannot be laid upon the use of a medium by which such transporta-
tion is effected. 'All restraints by exactions in the form of taxes
upon such transportation or upon acts necessary to its completion,
are so many invasions of the exclusive power of Congress to
regulate that portion of commerce between the states.' "82
30. Supra.
31. 279 U. S. 245 (1929).
32. Glouster Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 214 (1885) Italics
ours.
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This case shows that while the court might have held that
the tax on gasoline was only such an indirect burden and incidentally
affected interstate commerce, as might have been deduced from
Hump Hairpin Manufacturing Co., v. Emmerson, they took the
other attitude and held that such a regulation went too far and
the tax is within the class prohibited to the states.
The conclusions reached in the Helson case lead to the inevitable
result that since gasoline used may be an instrumentality of inter-
state commerce, therefore gasoline consumed in aircraft flying in
interstate business should be exempt from a state tax on the product.
This was the result reached in U. S. Airways Inc., et al. v. Shaw.s"
The State of Oklahoma had an excise tax on all gasoline consumed
in the state levied for the construction and maintenance of highways
and bridges. It was claimed that the interstate and intrastate busi-
ness of the company were so commingled and related that the tax
could not be apportioned between them, therefore the plaintiff denied
all liability for the tax. The court held that the plaintiffs were
concededly engaged in interstate commerce and that if the legislature
intended by the statute to tax gasoline used in interstate transporta-
tion then, whether the consumption occurred within or without the
state, the tax would operate as a burden on interstate commerce-
which is invalid because the states have no power to control or
regulate such commerce. 4 Since the interstate and intrastate busi-
ness of the plaintiff was actually found to be so commingled that
the tax could not be properly apportioned, the whole tax was held
unenforceable. 5
These decisions of the court are undoubtedly correctly decided
- in the light of the rule that a state cannot levy a tax on interstate
commerce in any form,3 6 and also due to the added fact that in the
opinions of the judges the gasoline consumed is as much an instru-
mentality of commerce as is the aircraft itself. This proposition
is again asserted and successfully maintained in Transcontinental
and Western Air Inc. v. Asplund,37 in which the Federal District
Court held that the New Mexico gasoline tax of five cents per
gallon is not applicable to gasoline purchased for use in aircraft
engaged entirely in interstate commerce and for use in motor
33. 43 Fed. (2d) 148 (1930).
34. United States Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 3.
15. See, also, Boeing Air Transport, Inc. v. Win. H. Eddleman, a case
on similar facts which is now being argued before the U. S. District Court
of Wyoming.
36. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (1888) ; Lying v. Michigan,
135 U. S. 161 (1890); Ozark Pipe Line v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555 (1925).
37. New Mexico District Court, U. S. Daily, Dec. 31, 1930, P. 8.
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trucks at the airport in connection with that interstate commerce.
The company does no intrastate business and its only stop in the
state is at Albuquerque. The purpose of the location of the airport
at such point was that it was an advantageous site at which to refuel
planes in their flights. The court held that the tax was a direct
burden on interstate commerce and was therefore in the class pro-
hibited to the states. Thus, it may be considered as settled law
that a state cannot tax gasoline consumed by aircraft in interstate
commerce nor can it tax gasoline used by a corporation engaged
in inter- and intrastate commerce when the business is so com-
mingled that the tax cannot be apportioned between them, and where
the taxing statute shows that the purposes of the act are the con-
struction, operation, and maintenance of highways.
Prior to the case of Panhandle Oil Co. v. State of Mississippi,"8
it was thought that a tax of a certain rate per gallon on the occupa-
tion of distributing gasoline was valid even though the distributor
was able to pass the tax on to the consumer, and that the distributor
would be liable for the tax even though he sold the gasoline to
governmental instrumentalities. However, in that case, the court
determined otherwise. The State of Mississippi had a tax of four
cents per gallon upon'the distributors of gasoline as a privilage
tax, which the distributors added to the purchase price. They re-
fused to pay the tax on gasoline which had been sold to United
States Government instrumentalities and when the state sued for
the tax they defended that the tax was unconstitutional. Their
contention was upheld by a majority of the United States Supreme
Court under the reasoning of a line of cases holding that "the states
may not burden or interfere with the exertion of national power
or make it a source of revenue or tax the means used for the per-
formance of federal functions.3 9 While Mississippi may impose
charges upon the plaintiff for the privilege of carrying on trade
that is subject to the power of the state, it may not lay any tax
upon transactions by which the United States secures things needed
for its governmental purposes. To use the number of gallons sold
the United States is in substance and in legal effect to tax the sale,'"
38. 277 U. S. 218 (1928).
39. The court cited: McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819)
Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435 (1842); Ohio v.
Thomas, 173 U. S. 276 (1899); Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522
(1916) ; Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51 (1920).
40. The court cited: Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460 (1881);
Frick v. Pennsylvania 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
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and that is to tax the United States-to exact tribute on its trans-
actions and apply the same to the support of the state. 41
Mr. Justice Holmes said in his dissent that, in the majority
opinion, an imperfect analogy with taxation that affects interstate
commerce is relied upon-but that obviously it does not follow from
the invalidity of a tax directly burdening interstate commerce that
a tax upon a domestic seller is bad because he may be able to shift
the burden to a purchaser, even though an agency of the government,
who is willing to pay the price which includes the tax.
From this case, it may be reasoned that, if a tax upon a dis-
tributor which, in turn, is passed on to the consumer, is invalid
when that purchaser is an agency of the government, then a tax
would likewise be invalid which applied to gasoline sold for use
in aircraft engaged in interstate commerce where the number of
gallons sold was the measure of the privilege tax, and where it was
in effect a sales tax. However, when it is considered that aircraft
travel with such high speeds and can cross state lines in such a
short space of time, it would seem that practically any flight might
be of an interstate nature. The decisions are innumerable which
hold that as soon as there is a crossing of a state line in a com-
mercial undertaking, there is interstate commerce which is con-
trolled by the federal government. There is a distinction to be
noted, however, in states where the tax imposed on gasoline con-
sumed in aircraft is levied for the specific purpose of erecting
beacon lights, of building public airports, and of promoting aviation
in general. In such cases the decisions of the court in relation to
gasoline taxes as applied to interstate busses would be analogous.
In Hendrick v. Maryland, 2 it was said,-"The movement of
motor vehicles over the highways is attended by constant and serious
dangers to the public, and is also abnormally destructive to the ways
themselves. Their success depends upon good roads, the construc-
tion and maintenance of which are exceedingly expensive.
In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state
may rightfully prescribe uniform regulation thereof of all motor
vehicles-those moving in interstate commerce as well as others
and it does not constitute a direct and material burden on inter-
state commerce." In Red Ball Transit Co. v. Marshall," we have
the following: "While it has been settled beyond peradventure that
a state which has furnished special facilities, such as public high-
41. Panhandle Oil Co. v. State of Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218 (1928).
42. 235 U. S. 610 (1915).
43. 8 Fed. (2d) 635 (1925).
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ways, for the use of those engaged in intrastate and interstate com-
merce, may exact compensation therefor, and if the charges are
reasonable and uniform they constitute no burden on interstate
commerce yet, on the other hand, the burdens so imposed must of
necessity be reasonable. The amount of the license fee or privilege
tax imposed need not necessarily be limited, even to those engaged
in interstate traffic to the actual cost of regulation, but may include
reasonable compensation for the use of the highways and repairs
thereof. Liberty Highway Co. v. Michigan P. U. C., 294 Fed. 703
(1923); W. U. T. Co. v. New Hope, 187 U. S. 419, (1903)."
States have power to impose excise or privilege taxes for use
of their roads for costs of maintenance, construction, or improve-
ment without violating the commerce clause of the Federal Con-
stitution," and since the Fourteenth Amendment simply requires
that the state legislatures treat all alike, a state tax on gasoline
for the privilege of using the roads is a valid constitutional tax. 45
The decision of the supreme court of Tennessee in Interstate
Transit Co., Inc. v. Lindsey,"' in which it is held that the imposition
of a tax on gasoline consumed in interstate busses for hire and
profit for the privilege of using the state roads is not an undue
burden nor an infringement of the interstate commerce power of the
federal government. These decisions point to a conclusion that a
specific tax on gasoline consumed in aircraft would riot be a burden
on interstate commerce if the funds so raised were levied to build
airports, etc., and such was the opinion of the Attorney General of
Michigan, when the question was presented to him for consider-
tion .47
The question has been raised, in those states where the tax
is placed an gasoline withdrawn from storage, whether or not the
tax could be collected when the gasoline was to be used in interstate
commerce. This question was answered by the Attorney General
of Alabama is his opinion to the State Tax Commissioner dated
September 30, 1930, in which he says, "Gasoline imported by the
distributor from another state but used in the conduct of its busi-
ness, loses its interstate character and may be subject to the excise,
consistently with the commerce clause. Bowman v. Continental Oil
Co., 256 U. S. 642 (1921). When gasoline is imported and comes
44. Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke Street Ry. Co. 273 U. S. 45
(1926).
45. Interstate Motor Transit Co. v. Kuykendall, 284 Fed. (2d) 635
(1922).
46. 29 S. W. (2d) 257 (1930).
47. Decision of October 17, 1930.
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to rest within the state and is withdrawn from storage it has passed
out of interstate commerce and is subject to the gasoline tax. The
fact that it is afterwards sold to airships for their own use while
engaged in interstate commerce does not violate the commerce
clause of the Constitution. '4  This opinion might lead one to be-
lieve that in a state where the tax was on the withdrawal of the
gasoline from storage, even though a fuel was used in interstate
flying, the tax would not be a violation of the commerce clause.
The result would be true from the standpoint of the tax being an
unjust burden on the producer, the oil company, and is a perfectly
logical deduction from the line of cases pertaining to coal, lumber,
and other products which, after having been a part of interstate
commerce, have finally come to rest within a state and taxed by
that state without a violation of the commerce clause. However, it
would appear that the Attorney General of Alabama may have erred
in deciding that the gasoline tax did not burden aviation. While
the tax may not be a burden on the vendor, the oil company, still,
from the vendee's position, a different problem arises. If the tax
is proportionate to the number of gallons sold and consumed, it i5
immediately reflected in the cost of operation of the transportation
facility and therefore is directly connected with the rates that the
public must pay for such transportation. It would be difficult to
deny that there is direct correlation between the cost of operation
and the rates charged and, this being established, a tax by a state
upon the motive power would seem to constitute an unjust burden
on interstate commerce.49
Some states have had bills pending before their respective legis-
latures which would require aviation gasoline to be colored, 0 such
gasoline to be exempt from taxation. On all such gasoline sold by
the oil companies they would not be required to pay the tax in the
first instance upon the statement of the purchaser that the gasoline
was to be used in aircraft. There probably would have been a great
abuse of the privilege of purchasing gasoline without paying the
tax by those who ostensibly, but not actually, purchased gasoline
for use in aircraft. Fortunately, none of these bills have been
passed to date.
48. Peterson Oil Co. v. Frary, 192 N. W. 366 (1923).
49. Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky, supra.
50. See the tabular list of Pending State Aeronautical Legislation,
2 JOUR. AIR LAW 216.
